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1SEX: 
Sexual Orientation, Sex Stereotyping  
and Title VII
Debbie N. Kaminer
Abstract
The United States Supreme Court recently heard oral argu-
ments in Altitude Express v. Zarda, a case that addresses whether 
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of sex” prohib-
its sexual orientation discrimination.  Relying on three related lines 
of reasoning, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit had held that it did.  First, sexual orientation discrimina-
tion would not have occurred “but for” the employee’s sex; second, 
sexual orientation discrimination relies on the sex-stereotype that 
individuals should be attracted to individuals of the opposite sex; 
and third, sexual orientation discrimination is a form of prohibited 
associational discrimination.  This Article opines that the strongest 
and most compelling of these three arguments is sex stereotyping 
since gays and lesbians fail to conform to the ultimate stereotype 
that real men are sexually attracted to women and real women are 
sexually attracted to men.  This stereotype is a means of maintain-
ing anachronistic and outdated gender roles for men and women.
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Introduction
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employ-
ers from discriminating against employees “because of  .  .  .  sex”1 
but does not explicitly prohibit discrimination “because of sexual 
orientation.”2  Prior to 2017, federal appellate courts unanimous-
ly held that sexual orientation was not included within the “sex” 
prong of Title VII.3  In 2017, the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy 
Tech Community College 4 became the first federal appellate court 
to hold that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination necessar-
ily encompasses sexual orientation discrimination.  More recently, 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
2. At the time of its passage, people did not understand Title VII as 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.  See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. 
Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 362 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (It is not 
“even remotely plausible that in 1964, when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable 
person competent in the English language would have understood that a law 
banning employment discrimination ‘because of sex’ also banned discrimina-
tion because of sexual orientation.”); but see William N. Eskridge, Jr. Title VII’s 
Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace 
Protections, 127 Yale L.J. 322, 342 (2017) (“A statute—like Title VII—that has 
been authoritatively interpreted, amended by Congress on several occasions, 
and then reinterpreted is a statute where original meaning itself is a dynamic 
process and involves updating.”).
3. See, e.g., Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2009); Vickers v. Fair-
field Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Income Support Div., 
413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care 
Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 
2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. 
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).
4. See generally Hively, 853 F.3d 339.  See also Brian Soucek, Hively’s 
Self-Induced Blindness, 127 Yale L.J. F.115 (2017) [hereinafter Soucek, Hively’s 
Self-Induced Blindness].
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed the rea-
soning of the Hively Court in Zarda v. Altitude Express.5
In reaching this conclusion, both the Hively and Zarda 
Courts relied on Baldwin v. Foxx, which held that “an allegation of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an alle-
gation of sex discrimination under Title VII.”6  In Baldwin, the 
EEOC articulated three related lines of reasoning.  First, sexual 
orientation discrimination would not have occurred “but for” the 
employee’s sex; second, sexual orientation discrimination relies on 
the sex-stereotype that individuals should be attracted to people 
of the opposite sex; and third, sexual orientation discrimination is 
a form of associational discrimination because employees are dis-
criminated against based on the sex of the person with whom they 
associate.7
This Article proposes that the strongest and most compelling 
of these three arguments is sex stereotyping.  As the Seventh Cir-
cuit explained, a lesbian plaintiff “represents the ultimate case of 
failure to conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood 
in a place such as modern America, which views heterosexuality as 
the norm and other forms of sexuality as exceptional).”8  While this 
Article will address the various court decisions and scholarship on 
this topic, the primary focus will be the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Zarda, the most recent federal appellate court holding that Title 
VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination.9
Part I of this Article discusses the but-for and association-
al discrimination analyses that underpinned the aforementioned 
holdings in Baldwin and Hively.  Part II discusses the sex stereo-
typing argument, which I argue is the most persuasive rationale 
for the inclusion of sexual orientation discrimination under Title 
VII.  While the primary focus of this Article is sexual orientation 
discrimination, Part II also explains why the sex stereotyping argu-
ment would protect all sexual minorities equally.10
5. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
6. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, 
at *5 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015) (involving a gay federal employee who alleged he 
did not receive a promotion because of his sexual orientation).
7. Id. at *5–8.
8. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
9. The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in this 
case.  See Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 
139 S. Ct. 1599 (April 22, 2019) (N0. 17–1623).
10. This Article specifically addresses discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and the author therefore primarily refers to discrimination against 
gay and/or lesbian employees.  However, as explained in the Article, Title VII’s 
prohibition on discrimination “because of . . . sex” should be read to prohibit 
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I. Sexual Orientation as a Function of Sex 
Discrimination and Associational Discrimination
In Zarda v. Altitude Express11, a skydiving instructor alleged 
that his employer, Altitude Express, fired him because he was gay. 
Zarda often participated in tandem dives, where he was strapped 
to a client; and in an effort to make female customers more com-
fortable, he sometimes told them that he was gay.12  Chief Judge 
Katzmann’s majority opinion13 relied on three lines of reasoning 
in concluding that the sex prong of Title VII includes sexual ori-
entation: (1) sexual orientation discrimination is a function of sex 
because Zarda would not have faced discrimination if he were a 
woman attracted to men, (2) the sex prong of Title VII includes 
associational discrimination, and (3) sexual orientation discrimina-
tion is a form of prohibited sex stereotyping.14  While all of these 
rationales are convincing, sex stereotyping is the most persuasive 
rationale for reasons that will be discussed in Part II.
A. Sexual Orientation as a Subset of Sex Discrimination
Katzmann’s majority opinion concluded that Title VII always 
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation because “sex-
ual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least in part, by sex, 
and is this a subset of sex discrimination.”15  The majority held that 
sexual orientation discrimination is always “because of  .  .  .  sex”16 
because it is impossible to determine an individual’s sexual ori-
entation without first identifying the individual’s sex.  Because 
“sexual orientation is a function of sex and because sex is a 
discrimination against all sexual minorities, who by definition are not cisgender 
and heterosexual.
11. 883 F.3d at 100.
12. Id. at 107.
13. One year earlier, Judge Katzmann had urged the full Second Circuit 
to reconsider its precedent holding that Title VII did not prohibit sexual ori-
entation discrimination.  See Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 
202 (2d Cir. 2017) (Katzmann, C.J., concurring) (urging “the Court to revisit the 
central legal issue confronted in Simonton and Dawson [holding that Title VII 
does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination] especially in light of the 
changing legal landscape that has taken shape in the nearly two decades since 
Simonton issued.”).
14. Both the argument that Zarda faced discrimination because he was 
a man (as opposed to a woman) dating a man, and the associational argument, 
received eight out of the thirteen votes on the en banc panel.  Zarda, 883 F.3d at 
100.
15. Id. at 112.
16. Id. at 113.
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protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows that sexual ori-
entation is also protected.”17
Similarly, the Zarda court explained that under the Supreme 
Court’s comparative test, the relevant question in sex discrimina-
tion cases is whether the employer treated an employee differently 
“but for that person’s sex.”18  Therefore, sexual orientation discrim-
ination violates the comparative test because the employer treats 
a man attracted to men differently from how they treat a woman 
attracted to men.  In other words, but for the employee’s sex—if 
he were a woman and not a man—the employee would not face an 
adverse employment action.19  Applying this logic, Zarda argued 
that, but for his sex, he would still have his job.
In a two-paragraph concurring opinion, Judge Cabranes 
echoed the above logic: “This is a straightforward case of statuto-
ry construction  .  .  .   Discrimination against Zarda because of his 
sexual orientation  .  .  .  is discrimination because of his sex, and is 
prohibited by Title VII.  This should be the end of the analysis.” 20 
On the other hand, Judge Lynch’s dissent was particularly skepti-
cal of this argument, opining that sexual orientation discrimination 
is not sex discrimination simply because it requires “noticing the 
gender of the person in question.”21  Judge Lynch’s reasoning is not 
persuasive because the discrimination does not simply involve an 
employer “noticing” the sex of the employee; rather, the discrimi-
nation involves an employer acting on what they notice.
Similarly, the Hively court recognized that discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is a function of sex.22  As the concur-
rence explained, “One cannot consider a person’s homosexuality 
without also accounting for their sex: doing so would render same 
[sex]  .  .  .  meaningless.”23  The concurrence also emphasized that 
Title VII’s text does not require a plaintiff to show that an employer 
17. Id.
18. Id. at 115 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 711 (1978)).  For a general discussion of the comparator test, see Suzanne 
B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 Yale L.J. 728, 736–40 (2011) 
(discussing the judiciary’s overreliance on comparators in discrimination law).
19. The majority also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that Title VII 
applied to male on male sexual harassment since the plaintiff was subjected to 
abuse and threats “because of sex”).
20. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 135 (Cabranes, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 156 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
22. Kimberly Hively alleged she was denied a fulltime faculty position 
at Ivy Tech Community College because she was a lesbian. Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Cmty. Coll. Of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017).
23. Id. at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring).
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discriminated solely because of a protected category.  Rather, the text 
of Title VII protects employees in cases where sex was a “motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”24  Similarly, the EEOC in Baldwin v. Foxx 
concluded that sexual orientation is always a function of sex.25
While sexual orientation discrimination is certainly discrim-
ination “because of sex,” the primary limitation of this line of 
reasoning is that it is overly formalistic.  The rationale relies on the 
literal definition of sexual orientation, which always takes account 
of an individual’s sex.  In an insightful essay, Brian Soucek explains 
how this rationale ignores a crucial point: discrimination based 
on sexual orientation is substantively sex discrimination because 
it polices gender norms in order to keep women subordinate to 
men.26  He further articulates how the very purpose of Title VII 
was to disrupt these norms and dismantle “constraining gender 
roles and hierarchies, in the workplace and beyond.”27  Professor 
Soucek’s essay was specifically about Hively, and he emphasizes 
that the Hively en banc panel did not cite a single “gender theorist, 
legal historian, or gay rights advocate.”28  While the Zarda court 
was somewhat more aware of the sexist and misogynistic roots of 
sexual orientation discrimination,29 the fact remains that a formal-
istic approach ignores how sexism and subordination of women are 
motivating factors in sexual orientation discrimination.30
While this Article specifically addresses discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, it should be noted that the “because 
of  .  .  .  sex” reasoning applies to other sexual minorities as well. 
One such example is transgender employees.31  As one district 
24. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m) (1964); see also Eskridge, Jr., supra note 2, at 
340 (“As amended in 1991, Title VII provides that an employer can violate the 
law in mixed-motive cases, so long as one significant ‘motivating factor’ is sex, 
even if ‘other factors also motivated the practice.’”).
25. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, 
at *5 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015) (“‘Sexual orientation’ as a concept cannot be 
defined or understood without reference to sex.”).
26. Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, supra note 4, at 121 (“[I]t 
would be nearly impossible even to glance at the queer and gender theory or 
antidiscrimination scholarship of the last two decades without encountering the 
notion that sexual orientation discrimination has something to do with the sub-
ordination of women.”).
27. Id. at 125; see also Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” 
of Sex Discrimination, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1307 (2012).
28. Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, supra note 4, at 116.
29. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 126.
30. See Part I.B for further discussion of the sexist roots of sexual orien-
tation discrimination.
31. The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a 
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court explained, it would be illegal for an employer to discriminate 
against an individual who converts from Christianity to Judaism, 
even if it does not discriminate against Christians or Jews, but only 
discriminates against converts.32  This type of discrimination against 
converts would certainly be discrimination because of religion.  Sim-
ilarly, it would be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against 
a transgender employee who transitions from male to female, even 
if the employer does not discriminate against men or women, since 
this would be discrimination “because of . . . sex.”33
B. Sexual Orientation as Associational Discrimination
In addition to holding that sexual orientation discrimination is 
always a function of sex, the Zarda court also held that sexual ori-
entation discrimination is illegal associational discrimination under 
Title VII.34  The associational theory of discrimination, first articulat-
ed over fifty years ago by the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia,35 
protects a person from discrimination based on the protected charac-
teristics of those with whom she associates.  The Second, Fifth, Sixth 
and Eleventh Circuits have extended the reasoning of Loving to hold 
that plaintiffs can bring associational race discrimination cases under 
Title VII.36  Relying on its reasoning in Holcomb v. Iona College,37 a 
case that will consider whether Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination be-
cause of sex protects transgender employees.  See EEOC v. r.G. & G.r. Harris 
Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (April 
22, 2019) (N0. 17–1623).
32. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008).
33. See Leora F. Eisenstadt, Fluid Identity Discrimination, 52 Am. Bus. 
L.J. 789, 820–21 (2015) (citing Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305–06).
34. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was the 
first federal appellate court to reach this conclusion.  See Hively, 853 F.3d at 339; 
see also generally Alex Reed, Associational Discrimination Theory & Sexual 
Orientation-Based Employment Bias, 20 U. Pa J. Bus. L. 731 (2018) (opining 
that the but-for and gender stereotyping theories of sexual orientation discrim-
ination are stronger than the associational theory of discrimination).
35. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s antimiscegenation statutes 
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
36. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff, a white 
man, alleged he was fired since his employer disapproved of his marriage to 
a black woman); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278 
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding that discrimination based on interracial marriages or 
association is prohibited by Title VII); Tetro v Elliott Popham Pontiac, Olds-
mobile Buick, & GMC Trucks Inc., 173 F.3d 988 (6th Cir. 1999) (employee al-
leged employment discrimination because his race was different than that of his 
daughter); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 
1986) (discrimination based on interracial marriages or associations is illegal 
race discrimination).
37. Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 130.
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race discrimination case, the Zarda court concluded that association-
al discrimination claims apply equally to cases of sex discrimination.38 
According to the court, if Zarda, a man, faced discrimination because 
he was in a relationship with another man, but a female employee in 
a relationship with a man would not have faced the same discrimi-
nation, then he is a victim of associational discrimination.  The court 
concluded that “sexual orientation discrimination, which is based on 
an employer’s opposition to association between particular sexes 
and thereby discriminates against an employee based on their own 
sex, constitutes discrimination “because of sex.”39
The Zarda court defined sexual orientation as a status and 
rejected the argument that associational discrimination protects 
only conduct, such as marriage in Holcomb.40  The court correctly 
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected the status/conduct 
distinction in cases involving sexual orientation discrimination.41 
Scholars have similarly opined that, because Title VII does not 
distinguish between same-sex conduct and status as an LGBTQ 
individual, it protects gay and lesbian employees who face sexual 
orientation discrimination, regardless of their engagement in same-
sex conduct.42  This is an important point, because commentators 
have expressed concern that courts might apply the associational 
argument in an underinclusive manner and thereby fail to protect 
individuals who experience sexual orientation discrimination when 
not in a same-sex relationship.43  However, as the Zarda court cor-
rectly explains, the conduct/status distinction is unavailing in cases 
involving sexual orientation.
Before reaching its conclusion on associational discrimination, 
the Zarda court touched upon the question of whether associa-
tional discrimination based on race is different from associational 
38. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 125. (“[W]e now hold that the prohibition on asso-
ciational discrimination applies with equal force to all the classes protected by 
Title VII, including sex.”).
39. Id. at 128.
40. Id. at 127.
41. See Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of 
Law, v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (holding that discrimination based on “un-
repentant homosexual conduct” is discrimination based on sexual orientation); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that laws that target “homosex-
ual conduct”, target homosexual individuals).
42. See Michael Kreis, Against Gay Potemkin Villages: Title VII and Sex-
ual Orientation Discrimination, 96 Tex. L. Rev. Online 1 (2017) (opining that 
courts should not distinguish between status and conduct); Deborah A. Widiss, 
Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 2083 (2017) 
(arguing that the artificial distinction between conduct and status should be 
rejected).
43. See Reed, supra note 34.
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discrimination based on sex.  The court responded directly to the 
argument of certain amici that, while racism was the motivation for 
antimiscegenation statutes, sexism is not the motivation for sexual 
orientation discrimination.  While the majority did cite one arti-
cle “suggesting that sexual orientation discrimination has deep 
misogynistic roots,”44 it ultimately determined that it did not have 
to resolve this dispute.  As the court explained, even if sexual ori-
entation discrimination does not “evince conventional notions of 
sexism, this is not a legitimate basis for concluding that it does not 
constitute discrimination ‘because of  . . . sex.’”45
The majority is clearly correct that sexual orientation discrim-
ination is associational discrimination because the employee quite 
literally faces discrimination based on the sex of the person with 
whom they associate.  Similarly, the Hively court explained that the 
Loving analogy was applicable because, “[i]f we were to change 
the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would 
be different.”46  Notably, this reasoning is essentially the same as 
the comparator argument made above.47  An employer is treating 
a male employee who is attracted to and “associates” with men dif-
ferently than it treats a female employee who is attracted to and 
“associates” with men.48  Similarly, under the comparator argument, 
an employer is treating a male employee attracted to men different-
ly than a female employee attracted to men.  As in Part I.A, the flaw 
with this line of reasoning is that it can be overly formalistic.
The stronger associational argument stems from the fact 
that sexual orientation discrimination is about sexism, just as the 
antimiscegenation statute in Loving was about racism.49  In his dis-
sent, Judge Lynch attempted to distinguish the Loving line of cases 
explaining that, “[i]n those cases, the plaintiffs alleged that they 
44. Zarda, 883 F.3d. at 126 (citing Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimina-
tion Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 197 
(1994)).
45. Id. at 127.
46. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349; see also Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 
(E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015) (“[A]n employee alleging discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation is alleging that his or her employer took his or her sex into 
account by treating him or her differently for associating with a person of the 
same sex.”).
47. See supra Part I.A.
48. See Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, supra note 4, at 119 
(“Call this an associational claim if you like, but it is really just the same com-
parator claim . . . ”).
49. At least four courts and twenty scholars have made the point that 
sexual orientation discrimination is really about sexism and sex-stereotyping. 
See id. at 121 n. 36 (2017).
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were discriminated against because the employer was biased—
that is, had a ‘discriminatory animus’—against members of the race 
with whom the plaintiffs associated.”50  Judge Lynch contrasts this 
with Zarda’s situation wherein there was no allegation that Zarda’s 
employer had a discriminatory animus towards men.  However, in 
making this distinction, Judge Lynch ignores that the discrimina-
tion at issue in Loving was not simply about animus towards the 
race of the person with whom the plaintiff associated.  It was also 
more generally about the races knowing their appropriate place in 
society and staying in their own lanes.51  Similarly, as discussed in 
Part II, sexual orientation discrimination stems from sexism, and 
the idea that men and women should recognize and maintain their 
“appropriate” societal roles, with women remaining subordinate to 
men.52  Sexual orientation discrimination is a means of maintaining 
a gender hierarchy.
Therefore, rather than conclude that associational discrimi-
nation applies even if sexual orientation discrimination does not 
stem from sexism, the Zarda majority should have emphasized 
that associational discrimination applies specifically because sexual 
orientation discrimination is really about sexism and sex stereotyp-
ing.  Yet, if the substantive rationale for prohibiting associational 
discrimination is that it is a form of sex stereotyping, then the sub-
sequent analysis should simply focus on how sexual orientation 
discrimination is a prohibited form of sex stereotyping.
II. Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Prohibited  
Sex Stereotyping
The sex-stereotyping argument is the most compelling argu-
ment as to why sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination 
“because of . . . sex”.53  In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Price 
50. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 160 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
51. The trial court famously stated in Loving: “Almighty God created the 
races, white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on different con-
tinents . . . he did not intend for the races to mix.”  Loving, 388 U.S. at, 3.
52. See infra Part II.
53. But see Vicki Schultz, reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 
Yale L.J. 1683, 1787 (1998) (opining that not all sexual orientation discrimina-
tion is based on gender discrimination).  See generally Brian Soucek, Queering 
Sexual Harassment Law, 128 Yale Law Forum Journal 67, 82 (2018) (opining 
that sex-stereotyping is a compelling argument as to why Title VII prohibits 
sexual orientation discrimination); Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the 
“Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimina-
tion, The Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of EnDA, 
66 Stan. L. Rev. 1333 (2014) (discussing the importance of the sex-stereotyping 
argument regardless of whether Congress passes ENDA).
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Waterhouse v. Hopkins54 that employers cannot discriminate based 
on sex stereotypes—that is, how the sexes do or should act.55  In Price 
Waterhouse, the employer discriminated against a female employ-
ee who was not stereotypically feminine: she did not wear makeup 
or jewelry and did not dress fashionably.  Similarly, employers who 
discriminate against gay employees discriminate against individu-
als who fail to abide by the stereotype that “real men” are sexually 
attracted to women and “real women” are sexually attracted to men. 
Relying on Price Waterhouse, Judge Katzmann’s majority opinion 
in Zarda explains that sexual orientation discrimination is “almost 
invariably rooted in stereotypes about men and women.”56  Simi-
larly, the Seventh Circuit extended the Price Waterhouse reasoning 
to sexual orientation discrimination, explaining, “Hively represents 
the ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype 
(at least as understood in a place such as modern America, which 
views heterosexuality as the norm and other forms of sexuality as 
exceptional).”57
Two points should be emphasized regarding sex stereotyp-
ing.  First, the Zarda court explicitly dismissed the argument that 
sexual orientation discrimination is not prohibited sex stereotyp-
ing because it affects both men and women equally.58  The court 
explained that, clearly, the employer in Price Waterhouse could 
not have defended itself by “claiming that it fired a gender-non-
conforming man as well as a gender-nonconforming woman.”59 
That would have been an explicit “admission that the employer 
ha[d] doubly violated Title VII.”60  Similarly, an employer who dis-
criminates “based on assumptions about the gender to which the 
54. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
55. See Zachary R. Herz, Note, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its 
Potential for Antidiscrimination Law, 124 Yale L.J. 396 (2014) (discussing the 
application of Price Waterhouse to antigay discrimination); Kimberly A. Yura-
cko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 757, 763 (2013) (“The Court’s prohibition actually encompassed two 
distinct types of sex stereotyping—ascriptive stereotyping and prescriptive 
stereotyping.”).
56. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119.
57. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
58. Judge Lynch’s dissent argued that a “homophobic employer is not 
deploying a stereotype about men or women to the disadvantage of either sex. 
Such an employer is expressing disapproval of the behavior or identity of a 
class of people that includes both men and women.”  Zarda, 883 F.3d at 158 
(Lynch, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 123.  It appears that the court is referring to men and women 
who have gender expressions that are nonconforming, and is not addressing 
discrimination against nonbinary individuals.
60. Id.
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employees . . . should be attracted has engaged in sex discrimina-
tion irrespective of whether the employer used a double-edged 
sword that cuts both men and women.”61
Second, Price Waterhouse’s prohibition on sex stereotyping 
does not prohibit all gender-based requirements for appropriate 
male and female behavior in the workplace, but rather prohibits 
those requirements that place an unequal burden on men and wom-
en.62  It is thus crucial to recognize that LGBT discrimination does 
in fact place unequal burdens on men and women and reinforces 
the privileged position of men.  A number of scholars have made 
this point.63  As Professor Soucek explained, homophobia maintains 
“men’s and women’s respective spheres, each with its own standards 
for appearance, affect, activities, occupations and desires . . .  Forc-
ing men and women into stereotyped, gender-specific boxes of this 
sort has long been seen to violate Title VII.”64  Judge Lynch’s dis-
senting opinion incorrectly dismisses this theory concluding, “the 
61. Id.
62. See also Meredith M. Render, Gender rules, 22 Yale J.L. & Feminism 
133 (discussing lack of agreement as to what constitutes a sex stereotype); see 
generally Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 
1187, 122–125 (2016) (discussing the equal burdens test and how some forms 
of sex-stereotyping are prohibited and others are not). The equal burdens test 
has been an issue in cases upholding different grooming standards for men and 
women in the workplace.  One of the best-known and most controversial cases 
is Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (uphold-
ing Harrah’s Casino’s sex-specific grooming requirements that required female 
employees to wear color-coordinated makeup and forbid male employees from 
wearing makeup at all).  The Ninth Circuit contrasted the female plaintiff bar-
tender in Harrah’s to the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, concluding that the bar-
tender was not unfairly disadvantaged in comparison to men and that her “ob-
jection to the makeup requirement, without more, can [not] give rise to a claim 
of sex stereotyping under Title VII.”  Id. at 1110.  For a critique of Jespersen, see 
generally Zachary A. Kramer, Three Tale of Female Masculinity, 13 Nev. L.J. 458 
(2013) (critiquing the current view of equality under sex discrimination law).
63. At least four courts and twenty scholars have made the point that 
sexual orientation discrimination is really about sexism and sex-stereotyping. 
See Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, supra note 4, at 121, n. 36.  The 
three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit, whose decision has since been vacat-
ed, also made this point.  See Hively, 830 F.3d at 706 (“Lesbian women and gay 
men upend our gender paradigms by their very status—causing us to question 
and casting into doubt antiquated and anachronistic ideas about what roles 
men and women play in their relationships.”).
64. See Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, supra note 4, at 123; see 
also Eskridge, Jr., supra note 2, at 370 (“The deepest violation of entrenched 
gender roles is a woman’s romantic partnership or marriage to another woman. 
It is a blatant violation of the core gender role: the gendered requirement that 
women are not fulfilled unless they find the right man, marry him, and rear his 
children in their household.”).
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homophobic employer is not deploying a stereotype about men or 
about women to the disadvantage of either sex.”65  This statement is 
unpersuasive and ignores the extensive literature on the misogynis-
tic roots of homophobia.
Additionally, many courts have relied on Price Waterhouse 
to prohibit discrimination against LGBT employees who engage 
in gender-deviant behavior while in the workplace.66  Therefore, if 
the law does not protect gay and lesbian employees who behave in 
a gender-conforming manner while at work, the law has the bizarre 
result of only protecting those employees that “look gay enough 
for Title VII.”67  As I previously explained, the following situation 
would result:
 If a gay man is the victim of discrimination because he 
behaves in an effeminate manner and therefore does not con-
form to the stereotype that men (straight or gay) should be 
masculine, he could have a cognizable claim based on sex 
stereotyping.  Similarly, if a woman (straight or gay) faces 
discrimination because she behaves in a stereotypically mas-
culine manner, she could likewise have a valid claim based 
on sex stereotyping.  However, if a gay employee behaves in 
a gender-conforming manner within the workplace, but her 
employer happens to learn she is a lesbian and fires her for 
that reason, she will not have a cognizable Title VII claim.68
The Hively majority understood this point well, explaining, 
“[o]ur panel described the line between a gender non-conformi-
ty claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin; we 
conclude it does not exist at all.”69
This distinction is bizarre because employers usually justify 
employment discrimination based on some type of business need 
or cost to the employer.70  For example, the Ninth Circuit Court 
65. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 158 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
66. See Herz, supra note 55, at 400.
67. Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Ti-
tle VII, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 175 (2014) (discussing how gay employees who “look 
gay” are more likely to be protected by Title VII than gay employees who are 
suspected or known to be gay but do not “look gay”).
68. Debbie N. Kaminer, Second Circuit to Hear Case On Sexual Orien-
tation Discrimination, 257:12 N.Y. L.J. at *4 (Jan. 18, 2017), [https://perma.cc/
DL49-9MJP] [hereinafter, Kaminer, Second Circuit to Hear Case on Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination].
69. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
70. For example, employers may be permitted to legally discriminate 
against an employee based on a protected trait if the trait is a BFOQ or “rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(e) (2012).  Similarly, while § 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 man-
dates accommodation of an employee’s religious needs, accommodation is not 
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of Appeals upheld a casino’s sex-specific requirement that female 
employees wear color-coordinated makeup and male employees 
wear no makeup since it was based on “commonly accepted social 
norms and [was] reasonably related to the employer’s business 
needs.”71  Yet, in the case of gay employees who conform to gen-
der norms while at work, there is no plausible business justification 
for discrimination since the employee is by definition conforming 
to societal norms.  To be clear, I am not arguing that discrimination 
against individuals who are gender nonconforming during the work 
day is, or should be, legally permissible.  Rather, my point is that in 
cases where employees do conform to gender norms while at work, 
employers cannot even rely on the defense of business need.  It is 
therefore striking for a court to hold that employers can discrimi-
nate against employees who are gay but who otherwise conform to 
heterosexual norms during the workday.  Perhaps the absurdity of 
this position was best summed up by Seventh Circuit Judge Rich-
ard Posner’s rhetorical question during oral arguments in Hively: 
“Who’s going to be hurt by giving lesbians and homosexuals a little 
more job protection?”72
Unfortunately, only six of the thirteen judges on the Zarda 
en banc panel supported the sex-stereotyping argument and agreed 
that “sexual orientation discrimination is almost invariably rooted 
in stereotypes about men and women.”73  Judge Jacobs’s concur-
ring opinion found the sex-stereotyping argument to be particularly 
troubling, explaining, “anti-discrimination law should be explica-
ble in terms of evident fairness and justice, whereas the analysis 
employed in the opinion of the Court is certain to be baffling to 
the populace.”74  While I certainly agree that the law must be 
required if it would cause undue hardship to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) 
(2012).  In such instances, lack of accommodation or discrimination against the 
religious employee is permissible.  See generally Debbie N. Kaminer, religious 
Accommodation in the Workplace: Why Federal Courts Fail to Provide Meaning-
ful Protection of religious Employees, 20 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 107 (2015) (discuss-
ing unifying principles the courts have relied on in interpreting § 701(j)).
71. Jespersen., 444 F.3d at 1104.  Interestingly, the policy at issue in this 
case was not justified by a BFOQ.  Id.; see also generally Alessandro Botta 
Blondet, The Court’s Undue Burden: A Look at Jespersen and its Inconsisten-
cies, 87 U. Cin. L. Rev. 523 (2018) (discussing generally the inconsistencies of 
Jespersen); see also William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the 
ninth Circuit’s Unequal Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated 
Grooming Standards Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1357 (2006) (discussing 
the limitations of Jespersen’s unequal burdens test).
72. See Kaminer, Second Circuit to Hear Case on Sexual Orientation Dis-
crimination, supra note 68, at 4.
73. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119.
74. Id. at 134 (Jacobs, J. concurring).
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understandable to society, as a whole, it is unclear who exactly 
Judge Jacobs thinks will be baffled by the sex-stereotyping argu-
ment.  I have taught about sex stereotyping, sexual orientation, 
and Title VII for years to both graduate and undergraduate busi-
ness school students at one of the most diverse universities in the 
United States.  My students consistently find the sex stereotyping 
argument to be the most persuasive rationale for why Title VII pro-
hibits sexual orientation discrimination.  While the sex-stereotyping 
argument might not resonate with a federal appellate court judge, it 
does make sense to many Americans.  Judge Lynch recognizes this 
in his dissenting opinion, acknowledging that “the most appealing 
of the majority’s approaches is its effort to treat sexual orientation 
discrimination as an instance of sexual stereotyping.”75
The sex-stereotyping argument also has the advantage of pro-
tecting all sexual minorities: because sexual minorities by definition 
are not cisgender and heterosexual, they do not follow the stereo-
type of what constitutes appropriate male and female behavior.76 
Sexual minorities do not follow their prescribed societal role, and 
thereby failed to maintain a gender hierarchy with women remain-
ing subordinate to men.  In recent years, the need to protect all 
sexual minorities has led to long lists of those entitled to protection. 
These lists have included strings of initials such as LGBTQIAA+, 
LGBTTIQQ2SA and, most recently, LGBTQ.77  The sex-stereo-
typing argument helpfully avoids the need to specify which sexual 
75. Id. at 156 (Lynch, J., dissenting).  Judge Lynch’s dissent also emphasiz-
es that, while employment discrimination based on sexual orientation is mor-
ally wrong, it is up to Congress to enact legislation prohibiting employment 
discrimination against gays and lesbians.  He summarizes the sordid history of 
sexual orientation discrimination in the United States, before concluding that, 
unfortunately, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation.  Judge Lynch emphasizes, “I would be delighted to awake one morning 
and learn that Congress had just passed legislation adding sexual orientation to 
the list of grounds of employment discrimination . . . I am confident that one 
day—and I hope that day comes soon—I will have that pleasure.”  Id. at 137. 
Similarly, the Hively dissent explicitly opined, “If Kimberly Hively was denied 
a job because of her sexual orientation, she was treated unjustly.”  Hively, 853 
F.3d at 372. (Sykes, J., dissenting).  Yet the dissent ultimately concludes that the 
majority decision was “a statutory amendment courtesy of unelected judges.” 
Id. at 360.
76. See generally Case, supra note 53 (discussing the importance of the 
sex-stereotyping argument regardless of whether ENDA is passed); Elizabeth 
M. Glazer, Sexual reorientation, 100 Geo. L.J. 997 (April 2012) (discussing lim-
itations of the law’s current definition of sexual orientation).
77. See generally Jonathan Rauch, It’s Time to Drop the ‘LGBT’ From 
‘LGBTQ,’ The Atlantic (January/February 2019), [https://perma.cc/F7QR-
YRW6] (opining that there should be a new terms that can be used to describe 
all sexual minorities).
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minorities Title VII protects because its rationale inherently applies 
to all sexual minorities.
Conclusion
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Zarda on 
October 8, 2019 and addressed the question of whether Title VII’s 
prohibition on discrimination “because of . . . sex” includes a prohi-
bition on sexual orientation discrimination.78  This Article proposes 
that the answer to this question is clearly ‘yes’.
The sex-stereotyping argument is the most compelling argu-
ment as to why sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination 
“because of  .  .  .  sex.”  While sexual orientation discrimination is 
always a function of sex under both the but-for and associational dis-
crimination arguments explored above, both of these rationales are 
overly formalistic.  Sex-stereotyping, on the other hand, addresses 
how sexual orientation discrimination is substantively sex discrim-
ination, because it polices gender norms in order to keep women 
subordinate to men.  I fully agree with Judge Jacobs’s concurring 
decision in Zarda that antidiscrimination law must be understand-
able to society as a whole, and the sex-stereotyping argument is the 
most compelling and persuasive reasoning.
By June 2020, the United States Supreme Court will hand 
down its opinion on whether Title VII’s prohibition on discrimina-
tion “because of . . . sex” includes a prohibition on sexual orientation 
discrimination.  The Court should hold that it does.  However, if the 
Court fails to do so, Congress should amend Title VII to explicitly 
add sexual orientation as a protected category.79
78. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100.
79. While this Article specifically addresses sexual orientation discrimi-
nation, Congress should amend Title VII to explicitly protect all sexual minori-
ties in the workplace.
